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Abstract 
In many developing countries, multinational enterprises (MNEs) in mining operate alongside 
fast-growing communities of informal artisanal, small-scale miners, This has led to direct 
conflict and competition for mineral resources among these mining parties. This paper 
introduces the Salience and Institutional Analysis and Design framework as a means to 
analyze the MNE strategies used to address informal miners across different governance 
levels in the gold mining sector of Ghana and discusses the implications of these strategies 
for sustainability. We identify the emergence of a cooperative strategy with informal miners 
as a sustainable alternative to the political strategy of reliance on the state to protect tenure.  
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1. Introduction 
The growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) in mining in emerging markets has 
been criticized for contributing to rising inequality and marginalization of communities that 
historically rely on artisanal, small-scale mining, posing a distinctive, sustainable 
development challenge (Aubynn, 2009). Artisanal, small-scale mining (ASM) that uses 
rudimentary techniques to mine gold, precious minerals, and coal is the most common form 
of mining in developing countries and is widespread in poverty-stricken communities 
(Verbrugge & Besmanos, 2016). It is a labor-intensive activity that can be formalized, where 
artisanal miners receive legal approvals from the state, or informal, where miners work 
without formal licenses (Tschakert & Singha, 2007). The ASM sector provides direct 
employment to an estimated 15 million people in 80 countries worldwide, supporting the 
livelihood of up to 100 million people (WB, 2009). At the same time, ASM poses serious 
challenges to sustainability due to poor health and safety measures, the use of child labor, and 
ineffective environmental protection due to the use of mercury (OECD, 2015; Veiga et al., 
2014).  
Since the 1990s, liberalization of investment regimes and mining codes in many 
developing countries has increased mining FDI in countries with a tradition of ASM. 
Simultaneously, informal ASM has rapidly expanded in the Global South, driven by rising 
commodity prices and lack of employment opportunities. This has led to direct competition 
and rivalry for mineral resources between mining multinational enterprises (MNEs) and 
artisanal miners (Hirons, 2014). Mining MNEs experience a unique dilemma when faced 
with concessions, legally acquired from the state, that are occupied by communities of 
artisanal miners. When attempting to remove artisanal miners by force, it increases 
operational and reputational risks for mining MNEs (Veiga et al., 2014). This study focuses 
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on the role of mining MNEs in the shift from confrontation to cooperation with artisanal 
miners and the consequences for sustainability. It argues that the role of the mining MNEs in 
the governance of mineral resources and relations with informal rivals has not been 
adequately conceptualized in international business and corporate sustainability literature.  
Literature on MNEs, corporate social responsibility (CSR), and sustainability does not 
focus on the rivalry between MNEs and illegal users of resources, who are treated as fringe 
stakeholders without salience. When it comes to the control of assets and protection of 
property rights in host countries, international business research often focuses on MNE 
relations with host governments, using political risk theory and political strategy (Boddewyn, 
2016; Stevens et al., 2016; Ramamurti, 2004; Zheng et al., 2016). A political strategy to 
defend property rights relies on strengthening the links with the state to improve the security 
of the tenure (e.g., using forced evictions and formalized policies), but fails to consider 
implications for sustainable development, especially poverty and inequality (Luo & Zhao, 
2013). Therefore, we need to look beyond the international business and CSR literature to 
find the appropriate conceptual means to explore sustainable and inclusive strategies for 
MNEs operating in complex institutional environments in emerging markets (Doh & Teegen, 
2002; Peng et al., 2008). 
To address this gap, this study proposes a new framework to analyze the interactions 
between MNEs and informal resource use competitors: the Salience and Institutional 
Analysis and Design (SIAD) framework, built on the elements of stakeholder theory and 
Institutional Analysis and Design (IAD), and developed outside the international business 
literature. The IAD framework, originally from the field of economics (Ostrom, 1990, 2010; 
Paavola, 2007, 2016), examines conflict, rivalry, and competition over natural resource use, 
where actors draw on formal and informal rules. IAD studies the interactions between human 
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activities in their biophysical and cultural contexts across three interlinked governance levels: 
operational (i.e., day to day interactions), collective-choice (i.e., organizational and field level 
rules), and constitutional (i.e., formal and informal institutions). As a framework, rather than 
a theory, IAD organizes academic research and can be complemented by other theories to fit 
a given research objective (Koontz, 2006). In order to contribute to the growing discussion 
about the role of mining MNEs in sustainable development, we integrate IAD (Ostrom, 2010; 
Paavola, 2016) with the stakeholder salience perspective that explains how companies act to 
satisfy stakeholder claims around natural resource use (Mitchell et al., 1997; Dahan et al., 
2015; Erdiaw-Kwasie et al., 2017).  
The emerging SIAD framework is applied to examine the stakeholder management 
strategy of mining MNEs focusing on cooperation with informal artisanal miners as an 
alternative to a political strategy relying on a state policy of exclusion of unauthorized users. 
The study analyzes how and why mining MNEs changed their approach to informal miners 
from confrontation to cooperation and how the assessment of the informal miners shifted 
from fringe to core stakeholders. Empirical evidence is based on the qualitative analysis of 26 
semi-structured interviews conducted with a range of stakeholders in the Ghanaian gold 
mining sector in 2005 and 2008.  
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on mining MNEs. First, we 
suggest that the strategic choice of cooperation with informal rivals for resources emerges at 
the operational level in recognition of the growing stakeholder salience of the informal 
miners. This occurs when political strategy is unable to deliver the effective exclusion of 
unauthorized users, which results in failures of the state and MNEs to expel or dissuade them. 
Second, we contend that a cooperative strategy implemented across governance levels can 
not only reduce MNE conflicts with informal users, thus assuring sustained access to 
 5 
 
resources, but can also contribute to poverty alleviation and reduced inequality. We find that 
MNE cooperation with informal miners increases the legitimacy and salience of these miners 
in the eyes of the government and other stakeholders, in a process of “legitimization through 
engagement.” Cooperation can also achieve goals of environmental protection by reducing 
negative environmental impacts arising from the poor resource use practices of the informal 
miners (e.g., the use of mercury in artisanal mining and uncontrolled land disturbance). Third, 
we argue that a cooperative strategy works at the collective-choice level of governance when 
it bridges competing formal and informal institutions that affect the operations of the MNEs 
in the context of weak national institutions in emerging markets. Finally, we argue that MNE 
strategies need to be supported by a dynamic stakeholder salience assessment because 
stakeholders can gain and lose salience and move from fringe to core and vice versa across 
different governance levels over time.  
The next sections review CSR and international business literature on strategies used 
by mining MNEs to deal with resource use rivals, then outline IAD and stakeholder salience 
frameworks. These sections are followed by discussions of the Ghanaian ASM context, 
research methods, findings, implications for theory and management practice, and the 
conclusion.  
 
2. Management of conflicts over natural resources 
2.1. CSR and international business 
The occupation of mining concessions by informal artisanal miners in Ghana presents 
an urgent challenge for MNEs. International business research has examined the relationship 
between mining MNEs and local communities in host countries from the perspectives of CSR 
(Frynas, 2010; Kapelus, 2002; Zheng et al., 2015), sustainable development (Kolk, 2016; 
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Kolk et al, 2017; Svensson et al., 2010), stakeholder theory (Crilly, 2011; Doh & Teegen, 
2002; Fassin, 2010; Friedman & Miles, 2002), and bottom of the pyramid sourcing and 
market entry (Prahalad, 2006). The literature provides insights into the roles of local 
communities in developing countries as suppliers, customers, engaged recipients of MNEs’ 
CSR projects, as well as challengers of unsustainable MNE practices, and providers of 
societal legitimacy and human capital resources to MNEs (Gifford et al., 2010).  
However, these perspectives are not useful for dealing with fringe stakeholders that 
are seen by the state as illegitimate trespassers (Tschakert & Singha, 2007). To date, the 
literature has paid limited attention to antagonistic relationships between MNEs and fringe 
stakeholders who lack legal legitimacy but compete with MNEs for access to natural 
resources. Antagonistic relations within MNEs and communities have been studied in social 
movements and anti-globalization literature (Bebbington, 2012; Kraemer et al., 2013). Social 
movement literature investigates collective efforts to change society, comprised of people 
united by a common set of beliefs about a preferred state of the world (Den Hond & De 
Bakker, 2007). However, poor communities competing with MNEs for the use of mineral 
resources on their concessions do not disrupt business operations as a means of anti-
globalization protest or part of social movements. Unregulated ASM is not a result of 
coordinated efforts to change society; rather, it is an ingrained activity of subsistence and 
livelihood. Rivalry with MNEs is the outcome of a lack of structural alternative means for 
subsistence. Thus, artisanal miners do not fit into any of the roles allocated to communities in 
the literature on CSR and sustainability in international business. 
When faced with competing claims, a natural strategy for an MNE is to stay within 
the bounds of regulation and side with legitimate stakeholders such as the state. To reduce 
political risks, such as insecure tenure, MNEs often choose a political strategy by developing 
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closer relations with the state to achieve beneficial outcomes from public policies (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2010; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Luo & Zhao, 2013; Zheng et al., 2016). With political 
strategies, MNEs rely on state intervention to protect property rights and solve conflicts with 
unauthorized parties (Boddewyn, 2016; Dunning, 1988, 1998; Holmes et al., 2013; Stevens et 
al., 2016; Ramamurti, 2004). If political strategies fail, the options are to exit or wait (Khanna 
& Palepu, 2010). However, neither of these strategies presents a sustainable solution. 
Forceful eviction of artisanal miners increases inequality and their marginalization, while exit 
or wait strategies deprive the host country of investment and fail to address the negative 
environmental impacts of unregulated ASM on sustainability. We now explore the IAD as an 
alternative framework to find sustainable solutions to the resource rivalry between MNEs and 
artisanal miners.  
 
2.2. Institutional approach to natural resource governance 
The IAD framework (Ostrom et al., 1994; Ostrom, 1990, 2010) analyzes the outcomes 
of human activities focusing on interactions between institutions, individual decision-making, 
and aspects of the physical world and community culture. Ostrom proposed IAD as a 
foundation to explore the underlying complexity of interrelated social and ecological 
sustainability challenges “to build a solid field of sustainability science” (Ostrom, 2007, p. 
182). IAD examines conflict and competition over natural resources and argues that self-
regulation and community cooperation offer a sustainable governance solution to 
management of natural resources as an alternative to private property and external authority.  
In emerging markets, where informal institutions often hinder implementation and 
enforcement of formal regulation (Peng et al., 2008), the literature on community 
management of common-pool resources can provide insights into collaboration between 
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MNEs and informal resource rivals in response to failures of the state to protect MNE 
property rights in a manner compatible with sustainable development. 
 Common-pool resources, such as fisheries, aquifers, or grazing areas, have two 
defining characteristics: a) low excludability, where it is difficult to exclude unauthorized 
users; and b) high subtractability, where every time an actor uses the resource, less is left for 
others to use, leading to high levels of rivalry and conflict over consumption (Ostrom et al., 
1994; Ostrom, 2010). A stable governance solution to competition over common-pool 
resources requires a community of actors, united by a common goal to preserve resources for 
continued use, to negotiate, monitor, and enforce the rules to protect and manage resources 
for the community benefit (Clement, 2010; Ostrom & Gardner, 1993). Following Saldarriaga-
Isaza et al. (2013), we argue that gold deposits that can be extracted with artisanal means 
share the defining characteristics of common-pool resources.  
IAD conceptualizes three interlinked governance levels where actors operate and 
action takes place; each functional level is regulated by corresponding institutional rules. The 
operational level is where rules or decisions about resource access are implemented and 
impact the physical world. The collective-choice level is where rules that govern resource use 
are designed and applied or where policy-making is conducted. The constitutional level is 
where rules of a higher order that affect both collective-choice and operational levels are 
made. These rules are difficult to change, as they define eligibility to design and participate in 
policymaking (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994).  
Paavola (2007, 2008) proposed three types of governance solutions to resolve 
resource conflict: state-based, community-based, and co-management. The latter conciliates 
private ownership with collective ownership to ensure successful outcomes for interested 
parties. A well-designed governance solution should provide institutional rules of exclusion, 
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entitlement, monitoring, and decision-making in order to support seven major governance 
functions of resource management: 1) exclusion of unauthorized users; 2) regulation of 
authorized resource use and distribution of benefits; 3) provisioning of goods and recovery of 
costs; 4) monitoring of resource users; 5) enforcement of resource use rules; 6) resolution of 
conflicts, and; 7) collective-choice for modification of solutions. If these functions are not 
effectively fulfilled at all three governance levels, the governance system will be unstable and 
eventually collapse (Paavola, 2016). 
An effective solution should provide low monitoring and enforcement implementation 
costs, and promote social justice and environmental protection (Dietz et al., 2003). 
Community-based and co-management solutions have lower implementation costs because 
users often monitor each other and enforce rules (Paavola, 2016). Mutual trust and 
acceptance of rules as legitimate among community members are essential for community-
based monitoring and enforcement (Dietz et al., 2003; Ostrom, 2010). IAD has relevance for 
international business in situations when MNEs attempt to secure tenure (i.e., the exclusion of 
unauthorized users) using political strategies or reliance on state-based governance solutions. 
MNEs can only succeed if a state-based solution can resolve the causes of conflicts between 
MNEs and ASM over resource use, monitor resource users, guarantee fair distribution of 
benefits, and gather collective-choice support for the exclusion of informal artisanal miners.  
The IAD framework can benefit international business research by examining the 
negotiation of rules between companies and other stakeholders across various governance 
levels (Ostrom, 1990, 2010), exploring their effects on the institutional environment in which 
MNEs operate and the outcomes for sustainable development such as poverty, inequality, 
wellbeing, and environmental protection (Batjargal et al., 2013; Holmes et al., 2013).  
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The IAD perspective, where formal and informal rules are equally legitimate as far as 
they contribute to the sustainable use of resources, provides the foundation from which to 
discuss cooperation over common goals and resources between MNEs and other actors, 
whether or not they are legally entitled to use the resources in conflict.  
International business research on property rights offers MNEs two strategies if the 
state fails to protect property rights: exit or wait (Khanna & Palepu, 2010). The IAD 
framework offers a third: MNEs can step in to regulate the conflict themselves through 
cooperation with informal rivals. 
The IAD framework has been criticized for an absence of power in its analysis 
(Clement, 2010). The framework does not enable a firm-level analysis, nor does it explain 
how for-profit businesses engage in decision-making that affects organizational goals, for 
instance, why an MNE may choose a cooperative strategy rather than a political one. We now 
explore stakeholder theory to address these limitations and to complement IAD in order to 
explain the strategic choices among the MNE strategies dealing with informal miners. 
 
2.3. MNEs and stakeholder management 
Stakeholder theory is a useful framework to analyze the relationships between MNEs 
and local actors in host countries and has been widely used to develop CSR programs 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Fassin, 2010). A stakeholder is “any group or individual who 
can affect or are affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 
46). MNEs are encouraged to develop constructive dialog with stakeholders on issues of 
mutual concern to achieve mutual benefit (Ali, 2017). When MNEs benefit local 
stakeholders, they can achieve organizational goals (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Phillips et 
al., 2003) and contribute to sustainability in emerging markets (Gifford et al., 2010; Campbell 
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et al., 2012). For instance, mining MNEs can build legitimacy and reduce their liability of 
foreignness when they implement CSR programs (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Frynas, 2010; 
Gifford et al., 2010; Zheng et al., 2015). Mining MNEs often negotiate legal and voluntary 
procedures for land access, acquisition, relocation, and compensation with stakeholders such 
as local communities and indigenous peoples (Keenan et al., 2016) who have legal rights to 
access natural resources (e.g., land, forests, water, and biodiversity resources) in and around 
mineral concessions and can be negatively affected by mining operations (Bebbington, 2012; 
Kraemer et al., 2013). 
Understanding how managers assign priorities to various stakeholders and their 
claims can help identify suitable stakeholder management strategies for MNEs (Bundy et al., 
2013). Mitchell et al. (1997) prioritize “core” or salient stakeholders that exhibit all three 
attributes of legitimacy, power, and urgency of claims. Conversely, “fringe” stakeholders 
lack one or more of these attributes, and thus, have limited salience (Hart & Sharma, 2004). 
Fringe stakeholders can be adversarial, poor, disinterested, divergent, isolated, weak, or 
illiterate parties.  
Power is the ability of one social actor to influence another social actor to do 
something that the latter would not have done otherwise (Mitchell et al., 1997). Power can be 
coercive, utilitarian, or normative and can be obtained by formal, political, economic, and 
relational means (e.g., centrality in stakeholder networks, alliances, and coalitions) (Erdiaw-
Kwasie et al., 2017).  
Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Legitimacy can be pragmatic, which relates 
to self-interest, benefit, exchange, and influence; moral, which relates to a positive normative 
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evaluation of an actor and his/her activities; and, cognitive, which relates to taken-for-granted 
cultural perspectives (Suchman, 1995). The assessment of stakeholder legitimacy and claims 
legitimacy is a social process that is co-determined by managers and other stakeholders, 
especially the government (Tashman & Raelin, 2013). Actors without legal legitimacy or 
groups engaging in illegal activities should be treated as non-stakeholders (Fassin, 2010). 
Illegitimate groups or organizations do merit consideration but attention to their claims is not 
focused on developing mutually beneficial relationships (Ali, 2017). 
Urgency is the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention 
(Mitchell et al., 1997). Urgency comprises time sensitivity (i.e., how important a claim is for 
the stakeholder) and criticality (i.e., to what extent delays on attending to the claim are 
unacceptable to the stakeholder and how actively the stakeholder is pursuing the claim). 
Urgency is increased by frequency of interaction between a firm and the stakeholder (Driscoll 
& Starik, 2004). Agle et al. (1999) found that urgency was the strongest predictor of salience.  
Salience perceptions are dynamic; managers prioritize and de-prioritize a 
stakeholder’s status over time (Khurram & Charreire Petit, 2017). Stakeholders gain salience 
through acquiring resources that increase their size, developing unique capabilities and 
advantages through coalition building or responding rapidly to the organization’s actions 
(Doh & Teegen, 2002). Illegal entities can acquire legitimacy over time, such as the 
emancipatory movements fighting colonial powers that were once considered terrorists or 
criminals (Ali, 2017).  
Stakeholder assessment is not independent from other stakeholder views (Dahan et 
al., 2015). The salience of a stakeholder can change when another salient stakeholder, such as 
a non-governmental organization, state institution, or another business, empowers these 
stakeholders by enhancing their capacity to make choices and transform those choices into 
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desired actions and outcomes (Erdiaw-Kwasie et al., 2017). The business-government-
community nexus framework suggests these parties can support or undermine each other’s 
salience (Dahan et al., 2015). The government is a key stakeholder that amplifies the salience 
of other stakeholders; MNEs often rely on the government to frame the relations with other 
stakeholders in host countries (Dahan et al., 2015).  
A major criticism of stakeholder theory is its firm-centric view of actors (Ali, 2017; 
Friedman & Miles, 2002). Integrating stakeholder salience with IAD addresses such 
criticism. The new SIAD framework expands the business-government-community nexus to 
analyze relations between the stability of governance solutions and changes in stakeholder 
salience at operational, collective-choice, and constitutional levels of governance.  
We now examine the context of ASM and mining MNE operations in Ghana.  
 
3. Conflict between informal artisanal miners and mining MNEs in Ghana 
Artisanal gold mining in Ghana dates back hundreds of years, preceding mechanized 
large-scale mining in the country (Hilson et al., 2007). Historically, artisanal mining was a 
community-led activity, which adhered to the rules enforced by customary authorities (i.e., 
chiefs who govern land and community relations in Ghana) who sanctioned mining and 
partook in its earnings. Under colonial rule, gold mining funded by foreign capital was 
conducted closer to the coast, leaving artisanal mining undisturbed in the rest of the country. 
After independence, the state attempted to limit customary authority by centralizing the 
governance of mineral resources under the central government, nationalizing, and later 
privatizing, large-scale mining (Hirons, 2014). Since the 1980s, new legislation has 
encouraged inward FDI. The Minerals and Mining Law of 1986 introduced tax reductions, 
variable royalties, unrestricted dividend transfers, and reduced import duties. The state 
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granted prospecting and exploitation rights to mining MNEs, distributed concessions around 
the country, and succeeded in attracting inward FDI, which became an important source of 
industrial growth and foreign currency earnings (Tschakert & Singha, 2007). Negotiations on 
new mines between the central government and mining MNEs excluded the interests of 
artisanal miners and customary authorities (Hilson et al., 2007).  
Artisanal miners could not acquire prospecting and exploitation licenses until the 
introduction of the Small Scale Mining Law of 1989 (Hirons, 2014). Due to the three-year 
regulatory gap, artisanal miners (locally called galamsey—a corruption of the expression “get 
them and sell”), who operated on lands granted to mining MNEs, gained the status of illegal 
or informal miners. Operational shortcomings of the Small-Scale Mining Law of 1989 
discouraged many poor artisanal miners from formalizing and applying for licenses. Instead, 
artisanal miners continued operating with the approval from local chiefs using informal, 
customary rules (Hilson et al., 2007; Tschakert & Singha, 2007).  
Growth of informal ASM in Ghana has exposed the inadequacy of the country’s 
regulatory system, highlighting the inability of the state to secure the exclusivity of the 
mineral rights to mining MNEs on awarded concessions. The spread of informal mining on 
MNEs concessions has led to conflicts, causing operational risks for mining MNEs and 
societal concerns for health and safety, environmental pollution, use of mercury, gender 
discrimination, and child labor (Bush, 2009; Hirons, 2014; Tschakert & Singha, 2007; Veiga 
et al., 2014).  
From 1989 to 2008, the government delivered a series of initiatives to formalize ASM 
with the assistance of the United Nations, the World Bank, and other international 
organizations (Yakovleva & Vazquez-Brust, 2014). These initiatives were aimed at 
controlling mercury pollution, enhancing the state capacity to enforce regulation, relocating 
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and confining ASM to specific land sites, and providing alternative employment 
opportunities to displaced miners (e.g., the Prestea Action Plan funded by the World Bank in 
2005). These top-down, state-based solutions to the governance of mineral resources failed to 
formalize the entire ASM sector, leaving mining MNEs vulnerable to trespass from local 
artisanal miners. By 2008, when these initiatives were completed, 80% of small-scale miners 
in Ghana were still unregistered, employing as much as 300,000 people (Hirons, 2014). 
When CSR initiatives to divert local communities from mining failed, some mining MNEs 
started to accept informal miners on their concessions, although this conflicted with the 
concession conditions (Aubynn, 2009).  
4. Research methods  
This research followed a case study approach (Yin, 2003) involving the longitudinal 
analysis (2005-2008) of activities of three gold mining MNEs operating in Ghana, two of 
them headquartered in the United States and one headquartered in South Africa. Two of the 
MNEs commenced operations in the 1990s and one in the 2000s. All experienced massive 
trespassing by informal miners. 
We analyzed secondary data on state-led initiatives (1994-2008) and corporate annual 
reports (2005-2008). This complemented primary data from 26 semi-structured interviews 
with managers from the mining MNEs and various stakeholders in Ghana conducted in 2005 
and 2008 (see Table 1). Interviewees were selected using the snowballing technique (Gifford 
et al., 2010; Kapelus, 2002); the initial interviewees were identified from core public and 
private actors in the Ghanaian gold mining sector. These were formally approached with 
letters and consent was sought for conducting interviews. Access to interviews with small-
scale miners was obtained through a traditional paramount chief who supported the project. 
Interviewing different actors allowed us to verify the findings and check for convergence 
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between sources through triangulation (Yin, 2003). Seven key actors were interviewed both 
in 2005 and 2008. In 2008, we did not directly interview small-scale miners but analyzed the 
changes in their situation using secondary data. Interviews were recorded and later 
transcribed verbatim. Field notes were taken during the fieldwork and provided contextual 
support for the analysis.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1  
 
Analyses were conducted using a staged coding approach (Charmaz, 2006; Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985). Emergent (inductive) and a priori codes (deductive) were developed to interpret 
the data (Charmaz, 2006). Thick description narratives, which are defined as accounts of 
organizational behavior in a context aimed at extracting meaning (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), 
were developed for individual interview transcripts and later aggregated by stakeholder type. 
In the process of thick description narration, emergent inductive coding themes were 
identified. Emergent themes signify patterns of data that describe the phenomenon and relate 
data to a research question (Charmaz, 2006). A priori, deductive codes were created to 
analyze the data and relate the study to the theoretical framework (Charmaz, 2006). Two 
researchers separately coded all the data using emergent and a priori codes. Both manual and 
computer assisted qualitative analysis (NVivo 10 software) were used. Researchers 
exchanged coding results and narrative descriptions for further interpretive analysis and 
writing.  
Emergent codes were developed for MNE led initiatives, government led initiatives 
and rules, customary authorities and informal rules, cooperative interactions, antagonistic 
interactions, unemployment, tradition, social sustainability, environmental sustainability, 
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economic development, profits, success, failures, and shifts in perception. A priori codes 
drawn from IAD included: a) governance levels – operational, collective-choice and 
constitutional, and b) institutional rules of exclusion, entitlement, monitoring, and decision-
making (Paavola, 2008). Additionally, interviews were searched and coded for stakeholder 
salience attributes: 1) power – coercive, utilitarian, and normative (Mitchell et al., 1997); 2) 
legitimacy – pragmatic, moral, and cognitive (Suchman, 1995), and legal (Agle et al., 1999); 
3) urgency – time-sensitivity and criticality (Mitchell et al., 1997) and, 4) proximity – 
geographical and emotional (Driscoll & Starik, 2004). 
 
5. Results: Applying Salience and Institutional Analysis and Design 
5.1. Political and cooperative strategies for informal mining  
The institutional environment where mining MNEs operate and interact with ASM in 
Ghana consists of two distinct regimes for managing natural resources: state-led and 
customary. The formal state regime centers on state authority. The government sanctions the 
rules of exclusion of unauthorized users, entitlement, and monitoring. Decision-making is 
focused on interests of the state and the state-authorized mining parties: MNEs, registered 
ASM operators, and international organizations (i.e., funders of intervention programs). The 
state regime rests on the rule of law and principles of private property, securing minerals 
rights with registered users. The informal, customary regime centers on the authority of 
traditional chiefs, who sanction the rules of exclusion, entitlement, and monitoring. Decision-
making focuses on interests of local communities including artisanal miners. The customary 
regime consists of historically developed informal rules embedded in traditional and cultural 
norms and applies to both registered, unregistered artisanal miners, and local communities. 
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This makes it difficult for MNEs to distinguish between the informality of artisanal miners 
and the legitimacy of local communities.  
In the 1990s and 2000s, mining MNEs followed a political strategy to secure tenure 
by building close links with the government to respect property rights. It included removal of 
informal miners by police and military forces and support of state-interventions to relocate 
informal miners to alternative sites. The political strategy involved MNEs relying on 
government policy to promote formalization in the ASM sector and public dialogue to 
convince informal miners to abandon occupied concessions. In addition, mining MNEs 
partnered with government and international organizations to deliver CSR initiatives, such as 
the Alternative Livelihood Program, geared towards poverty alleviation and aimed at 
diverting local communities from entering informal mining. The initiatives offered training 
and skill provision to local communities and encouraged alternative employment and 
livelihood opportunities; however, by 2005, these had drastically failed to reduce informal 
mining.  
Political strategy underestimated the resilience of the informal ASM sector and the 
strength of informal rules governing the sector, which are deeply embedded in rural 
communities: “…local people are benefiting [by ASM], they see the registered companies 
[MNEs] as a threat to their livelihood…” (Manager, MNE A, 2008). Traditional chiefs exert 
considerable presence at the operational level by allowing access to mineral resources, while 
local communities support informal activities as morally and culturally legitimate. The 
political strategy of mining MNEs heavily overestimated the state capacity to regulate 
mineral resource use and deliver on functions of exclusion of unauthorized users, monitoring, 
and enforcement of rules. Public policy ignored the realities of artisanal mining communities, 
where poor communities were driven to artisanal mining seeking productive employment and 
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income earning, and instead, insisted that informal miners should be excluded from accessing 
mineral resources and from the design of policy interventions.  
The move from confrontation to cooperation started at an operational level. Following 
failures to enforce the exclusion of unauthorized users through public policy intervention, 
mining MNEs started to adopt a co-management governance solution with the ASM sector. 
MNEs cooperated directly with informal miners and co-existed on the same concessions, 
allowing them to mine in selected areas. MNEs also coached artisanal miners on adopting 
safer and sustainable mining practices. Thus, the artisanal miners were entitled by MNEs as 
resource-users and decision-makers at the operational level. “Yes, you are looking at a 
situation where they coexist because if you go to [the MNE Y]. There are some areas of low 
grade. And [the MNE] leaves some areas for the small-scale miners…as a means of helping 
them to get the plot and also minimize the trespassing and so on” (Government Official 8, 
2008). This cooperation regulated conflict and included the artisanal miners and the MNEs 
jointly enforcing new rules of exclusion, with artisanal miners preventing new entrants from 
accessing the concession: “…small-scale miners…will fend-off new entrants…so there’s a 
collaboration between the large-scale miners and small-scale miners…there is a need for the 
large-scale miners and the small-scale to coexist peacefully” (Government Official 7, 2008). 
In 2005, cooperative strategies were kept at the operational level and adopted only by 
a few pioneering MNEs. By 2008, dissemination of successful outcomes resulted in a wider 
adoption of cooperative strategies at a collective-choice or field level. MNEs started to 
acknowledge the need to collaborate with informal miners in and around the concessions in 
their annual reports, while, at a global level, international mining associations started to 
discuss the possibilities of cooperation with informal miners as part of CSR and sustainable 
development strategies to aid poverty alleviation and reduce environmental pollution (see 
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ICMM, 2009). Cooperative strategies were collectively endorsed by the mining industry 
because they enabled MNEs to formulate common rules across the sector. Mining MNEs 
sought cooperative arrangements with informal miners as opposed to direct confrontation. 
However, the success of such cooperative strategies rested on mutual trust. “They must trust 
you…When you say you will do this, you do it…You must be seen to be doing something for 
the community and you must let them know that you can develop some alternative programs” 
(manager, MNE A, 2008). 
As the political strategy relies on the state enforcing exclusion and entitlement rules, 
failure means that MNEs cannot achieve their aim of property right protection. The 
cooperation with informal miners constitutes a new MNE strategy in securing tenure and 
contributing to sustainable development. It relies on collective action involving MNEs, 
artisanal miners, and customary authorities. It shifts the functions of exclusion of 
unauthorized users, regulation of authorized use, enforcement, and monitoring of rules into 
the sphere of negotiation between mining MNEs and selected informal miners (see Table 2).  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
The benefits of the MNE cooperative strategies include the reduction of conflict, 
improved security of mineral operations, and control of land, mineral resources, and 
environmental degradation. It is a suitable response to the institutional environment, 
characterized by the presence of formal and informal rules at various levels. However, the 
stability of this co-management governance solution relies on the maintenance of negotiated 
informal rules. Since there are limitations for both political and cooperative strategies to 
deliver stable solutions benefiting the business objectives of mining MNEs, we assume that 
 21 
 
MNEs use both political and cooperative strategies in this challenging institutional 
environment.  
 
5.2. Shift in the stakeholder salience assessment by mining MNEs and the government 
 In 2005, unregistered artisanal miners were considered illegitimate, criminal 
trespassers who should be removed from mineral concessions by force. By 2008, informal 
miners were acknowledged to be part of local communities whose claims were addressed by 
business strategies at operational and collective-choice levels. This shift in attitudes was a 
result of the increased salience of the informal miners, changing their status from fringe to 
core stakeholder, and this is demonstrated through the attributes of urgency, power, and 
legitimacy.  
Urgency: MNEs’ perception of the urgency of the claims of artisanal miners grew 
from several elements: a) artisanal miners’ abilities to physically occupy land and cause 
disturbances to business operations; b) negative impacts of unregulated ASM on 
sustainability, causing environmental pollution, augmenting health, safety, and environmental 
risks, and increasing compliance costs; c) escalation of artisanal miner numbers at the 
concession and their capacity to resist forceful removal; d) prolonged impact on MNE 
activities owing to change from sporadic to permanent ASM camps; e) ASM gaining local 
community support through offering jobs, income, and support for local economies. 
Proximity also contributed to urgency (Driscoll & Starik, 2004). Not only the geographical 
proximity of artisanal mining occupying concessions, but also the economic and cultural 
closeness of artisanal miners with local communities, which considered them as legitimate 
community members.  
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Initially, MNEs considered local communities residing around the mines as salient 
stakeholders, but refused to acknowledge artisanal miners as legitimate community members. 
Such assessment was influenced by government officials who dismissed artisanal miners as 
opportunistic nomads. Later, MNEs and the government had to recognize the undeniable link 
between artisanal mining and the livelihood of rural communities. “They are the community. 
You have to work with the community” (Government Official 5, Ghana, 2008). By 2008, the 
boundary between artisanal miners and local communities had blurred. Local community 
members, including women, youths, local farmers, and other rural workers, had joined the 
ranks of artisanal miners on a temporary, seasonal, or permanent basis. The urgency of 
addressing the specific issue of artisanal mining had spilled over into the area of local 
community and social relations for the MNEs. The support that local communities and 
traditional authorities extended to artisanal miners indicates that ASM salience grew not only 
at the operational level but at the collective-choice level, where salient stakeholders treated 
artisanal mining as an urgent community issue.  
Power: By 2008, informal artisanal miners had gained coercive, utilitarian, and 
normative power at the operational and collective-choice levels. Their coercive power relates 
to their ability to resist expulsion, their persistence in returning to the concessions, and the 
ease in which local laborers can enter informal sectors, reducing the effectiveness of formal 
exclusion and monitoring rules implemented by the state and companies. Growing 
organizational, technical, financial, and labor resources at the disposal of unregistered 
artisanal enterprises increased their utilitarian power with communities and their power to 
effect change at operational and collective-choice levels. The normative power of artisanal 
miners is linked to the customary regime, which uses informal rules of entitlement to access 
and extract resources and customary authorities. Although the customary regime was in 
decline due to state policies and community undermining of traditional norms, artisanal 
 23 
 
mining represented a community-based management of resources, a way to continue cultural 
traditions and rules.  
Geographical spread and countrywide pervasiveness of ASM commanded further 
collective action on the part of industry members and the government. Artisanal miners and 
supporting local communities could influence political processes through voting and coalition 
building with other fringe stakeholders displaced by MNEs. ASM visibility rose during 
political elections and quickly became a matter of public debate nationally and 
internationally, attracting the attention of academia and civil society organizations.  
Legitimacy: Although lacking legal legitimacy, informal miners gained moral 
legitimacy among various organizational stakeholders such as local communities and civil 
society organizations. The issue of poverty alleviation and rural unemployment had changed 
the perceptions of artisanal miners from “criminal trespassers” to “local communities earning 
their livelihood.” The initial assessment of informal miners as illegal and even criminal had 
informed public policy and formalization interventions, excluding informal miners from 
consultation and the design of interventions. Lack of cooperation with informal miner claims 
reduced the effectiveness of public policy intervention on which the political strategy of the 
MNEs relied.  
Poverty alleviation and the promotion of rural livelihoods had become part of the 
public policy agenda that legitimized the moral claims of informal miners. Applying forceful 
expulsion of poor communities from accessing mineral resources to support livelihoods 
raised questions of the violations of human rights, exposing both government policy and 
companies’ actions to criticism from civil society organizations. A change in managers’ and 
government officials’ perceptions took place both at operational and collective-choice levels. 
At the collective level, the Ghanaian Chamber of Mines started to acknowledge the plight of 
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unregistered miners, companies started to acknowledge the legitimacy of informal miners in 
their corporate reports, and the international mining association discussed cooperation with 
artisanal miners (ICMM, 2009). Once the legitimacy of the informal miners had grown at the 
collective-choice level, the government’s assessment of the legitimacy of the artisanal miners 
did a U-turn (see Table 3). In 2008, government officials endorsed the cultural legitimacy of 
artisanal mining rooted in the history and traditions of rural communities in Ghana. “I know 
small-scale mining in Ghana had been like part and parcel of the people because small scale 
gold mining in this country dates as far back as 15th century. They have been the system for 
all these years, we cannot pretend they are not part of the system now” (Government Official 
3, 2008). 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
We can see the pattern of the increased stakeholder salience of the artisanal miners 
across different governance levels, resulting in the social upgrading of these informal 
economy actors. The bottom-up amplification of the artisanal miner salience among MNEs 
started at the operational level through the artisanal miners’ coercive power, then moved 
upwards to the collective-choice level, gaining legitimacy in the eyes of other legitimate 
stakeholders such as customary authorities and local communities. MNEs started to formalize 
cooperative agreements with selected informal mining groups. Following the success of 
MNEs’ cooperative strategies, the government reassessed the salience of artisanal miners and 
created public policy to address the entire ASM sector, both registered and unregistered. At 
the constitutional level, however, the state regime maintained formal rules of exclusion of 
unregistered actors from accessing mineral resources.  
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6. Discussion 
The linkages among the informal economy, inequality, and poverty have long been 
established by development economists (Ostrom, 2007), who emphasized the responsibility 
of formal actors to engage in the social upgrading of informal economy actors (Rivera-Santos 
et al., 2015). While the focus of economists has been on state policy, the role of MNEs in this 
social upgrading process is still unclear. Despite the emerging CSR literature investigating 
the relationships between business and informal economy actors in Africa (Rivera-Santos et 
al., 2015; Demuijnck & Ngnodjom, 2013; Lund-Thompsen et al., 2016), the antagonistic 
relations between MNEs and fringe stakeholders competing for the use of resources remains 
unexplored. There is lack of empirical evidence and theory to help understand the forces that 
can drive the cooperation and participation of the MNEs in social upgrading of informal 
rivals.  
Our SIAD framework can contribute to address this outstanding gap, thus, enabling 
CSR policies of MNEs to align with stakeholder management strategy and more effectively 
target poverty alleviation and reduction of inequality. The SIAD framework helps to 
conceptualize the stakeholder management and cooperative strategy of the MNEs as a co-
management solution to natural resource governance, which is an alternative to political 
strategy that supports a state-based solution to natural resource governance (Dietz et al., 
2003; Paavola, 2008). MNEs can assist in maintaining the successful governance of natural 
resources by cooperating with other resource users when state-based solutions are failing to 
deliver functions of exclusion, entitlements, and monitoring. Cooperation could become a 
stable governance solution when actors accept it as a legitimate solution to avoid further 
conflict (Ostrom, 2010; Paavola, 2016). The political strategy of MNEs to support state-based 
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solutions to remove unauthorized ASM operators from accessing the resource has not only 
proven to be unsuccessful and confrontational but also damaging to the reputation of MNEs.  
The political strategies of the MNEs were challenging due to several reasons. First, 
coexistence of competing formal and informal governance regimes complicate the 
institutional environment in which MNEs operate. Reliance on formal regulation faced 
operational level challenges. The government was not able to fully enforce formal monitoring 
and enforcement rules of resource management since informal rules were persistent at 
operational and collective-choice levels. Second, MNEs and government officials 
underestimated the power of informal users and customary authorities to influence corporate 
operations and their stakeholders. The growing power of informal miners derailed top-down 
formalization and relocation solutions. Third, the context of poverty and the significance of 
informal mining for rural economic development increased the legitimacy of ASM in the 
eyes of the public and local communities, reinforcing the claim that informal miners were 
fighting poverty and unemployment. The lack of alignment between MNEs’ political 
strategies and context-sensitive stakeholder salience assessment leads to strategy failure and 
unwelcome outcomes such as conflict.  
The SIAD framework contributes to incipient research on the role of MNEs in the 
implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (e.g., Kolk et al., 2017). 
SIAD offers MNEs operating in developing countries, and wanting to contribute to SDGs, a 
new approach for dealing with poor and informal resource users through cooperation and 
network stakeholder appraisal. This will lead to social upgrading of informal economy actors, 
which is critical in achieving SDG1 (poverty alleviation), SDG8 (sustainable work and 
economic growth), SDG10 (reduced inequalities), and SDG16 (peace, justice, and strong 
institutions) (ILO, 2017). 
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The re-evaluation of poor and marginalized groups using a networked stakeholder 
appraisal will result in designing new and more inclusive corporate strategies for poor and 
marginalized groups when legitimate stakeholders, such as local communities, can help build 
the legitimacy of previously non-salient stakeholders. A greater involvement of MNEs with 
the SDGs and the uptake of corporate strategies for eliminating poverty and inequality can 
contribute to increasing the social legitimacy of MNEs in developing countries. The 
cooperative strategies of the MNEs successfully perform all governance functions at 
operational and collective-choice levels and contribute to the achievement of SDGs on 
poverty alleviation, reduction of inequality, and environmental protection (Dietz et al., 2003; 
Paavola, 2008). The use of the SIAD framework enables three important contributions to the 
field of research on MNEs and SDGs. First, as SDGs set national level objectives, the SIAD 
framework helps MNEs evaluate whether corporate strategies provide successful solutions to 
wider resource governance benefiting the nation (see Table 2). Second, the SIAD framework 
can help MNEs appraise stakeholder salience across different levels, operational, collective-
choice, and constitutional, thus, exposing MNEs to networked societal demands and allowing 
MNEs to navigate through a complex web of actors who have varying attributes of power, 
legitimacy, and urgency at different functional levels. Third, cooperation with informal users 
is a suitable corporate response to doing business in a polycentric institutional environment in 
developing countries (Batjargal et al., 2013), where informal and formal rules are at play and 
several centers of authority govern the institutional environment (Ostrom, 2010). Cooperation 
with informal rivals is not only essential to address developmental challenges, but also to the 
survival of foreign investment in countries where informal rules regulating economic 
activities are prevalent.  
Our analysis demonstrates that the emergence of a cooperative strategy relates to the 
MNEs’ reappraisal of stakeholder salience. Informal miners gained an important status as 
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salient stakeholders, effectively moving from fringe to core in relation to the MNE strategies. 
This finding confirms that stakeholder salience is a dynamic process negotiated in the 
government-business-society nexus, where government, business, and community exchange 
knowledge on the urgency, power, and legitimacy of stakeholder claims (Dahan et al., 2015; 
Khurram & Charreire Petit, 2017; Shivarajan et al., 2015). Further, local communities act as 
important catalysts in changing managers’ perceptions about the legitimacy of social groups 
and their claims, especially by awarding them moral legitimacy.  
Following government-business-community nexus theory (Dahan et al., 2015), we 
suggest that MNEs can increase the salience of marginal social groups by directly engaging 
with them and involving them in corporate strategies. We call this process “legitimization 
through engagement.” MNEs legitimized fringe stakeholders by entering into cooperative 
strategies at the operational and collective-choice levels. As a result, the government started 
to accept the legitimacy of informal miners. Global stakeholders usually influence MNE 
decision-making, but in this case, they initially sided with the government in denying salience 
to informal miners and supporting state-based governance of mineral resources. Over the 
years, when cooperative strategies of MNEs proved successful, international organizations 
and global mining associations also changed their stance on artisanal mining and now 
promote greater cooperation (WB, 2009). However, informal miners do not yet warrant the 
status of core stakeholders at the constitutional level in the formal property regime, and a 
voluntary code of conduct for MNEs explicitly reinforces such an approach at the 
constitutional level.  
We theorize that salience of a stakeholder group can differ depending on the level of 
governance; it can be considered salient at the operational and collective-choice levels, but 
not salient at the constitutional level. However, the salience of stakeholders across all 
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governance levels is related, as knowledge about the stakeholder salience appraisal is shared 
in the government-business-community nexus. We suggest that core stakeholders can gain or 
lose salience and move across the institutional levels as depicted in Figure 1. When 
institutional rules change to exclude a stakeholder, the salience of these stakeholders is 
diminished and they can potentially be moved from core to fringe, as was the case with 
customary authorities who were deprived of salience by the formal property regime. We 
conclude that when a stakeholder moves from fringe to core at any governance level, existing 
MNE strategies become unstable. MNEs should start paying distinctive attention to claims of 
new core stakeholders, adapt to include them, and devise new corporate strategies 
accordingly.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
Contributing to the IAD literature, our study suggests that governance solutions to the 
management of resources, along with changes in stakeholder salience, can be initiated at 
constitutional, collective-choice, and operational levels of governance. Increased salience 
enhances formerly illegitimate stakeholders’ capacity to make choices and transform those 
choices into desired actions and outcomes (Erdiaw-Kwasie et al., 2017). At the constitutional 
level, core stakeholders are those whose opinions count in setting the rules. At the collective-
choice level, core stakeholders are those whose interests are considered when rules are 
implemented. At the operational level, core stakeholders are those who influence operational 
level decisions. Thus, stakeholder salience and types of governance solutions (state-led, 
community-based, and co-management) can differ depending on the level of governance. We 
also suggest that both stakeholder salience and governance solutions will converge and 
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stabilize over time when actors transfer knowledge used in making salience assessments and 
work together on a successful governance solution. Bottom-up cooperation arrangements that 
emerge at the operational level have the ability to move up to the constitutional level. For 
instance, amid government skepticism, MNEs started to cooperate with ASM in concessions 
at the operational level. This was later accepted by mining industry associations at the 
collective-choice level, and finally, the government supported these negotiated agreements as 
a key avenue to solve conflict in the mining sector.  
 These conceptual insights contribute to international business literature, the IAD 
framework, and stakeholder theory. In summary, SIAD suggests that: a) MNEs need to 
consider the implications for sustainable governance of resources when choosing corporate 
strategies to deal with informal resource users; b) salience is a function of the interactions in a 
web of stakeholders and must be studied when analyzing governance solutions; c) salience 
differs per level of governance considered; d) the salience of stakeholders included and 
excluded in a governance system and the stability of governance solutions are interdependent, 
and; e) differences in stakeholder perceptions of other stakeholders’ salience can lead to 
flaws in the design of governance solutions, but such differences tend to stabilize over time. 
Our results are aligned with conceptual developments in stakeholder theory proposing that 
stakeholder salience is a social process, wherein salience is co-determined by stakeholders in 
stakeholder networks (Tashman & Raelin, 2013).  
 Our study supports the relevance of the SIAD framework to international business 
research by examining institutional rules and functions of the resource use governance system 
in which MNEs operate. The SIAD improves the understanding of challenges faced by MNEs 
competing for resources with informal rivals. On its own, stakeholder salience is a narrow 
slice of corporate strategy. It does not touch on how corporate strategy can be guided by 
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wider structures such as governance of resources that involve both state and non-state actors 
at different governance levels. Our integrative SIAD approach suggests that companies 
should not only rely on stakeholder analysis in decision-making affecting organizational 
goals and instead consider implications to governance solutions and sustainable development 
such as poverty alleviation and environmental protection. This mirrors the argument of 
Paavola (2008, 2016) that a successful governance solution should address sustainable 
development challenges. 
By introducing stakeholder salience assessment, SIAD adds a power dimension to the 
IAD analysis. Firms accept cooperation in sharing resources with informal actors as an 
adaptive response to the mounting power and legitimacy of stakeholders. In our case, 
informal actors gained power through non-coordinated strategies of mobilization, formation 
of political networks, and interdependencies with communities as well as resilience and 
velocity in response to actions attempting their exclusion. This supports the proposition of 
Doh & Teegen (2002): stakeholders strengthen their salience by acquiring resources, 
coalition building, and developing unique capabilities and rapid responses to organizational 
actions. In addition to the original attributes of stakeholder salience (Mitchell et al., 1997), 
our analysis supports “proximity” (Driscoll & Starik, 2004) as an additional predictor of 
salience. Proximity was very relevant for explaining salience at the operational level; it 
involves physical as well as emotional proximity and empathy with the plight of informal 
miners. However, our findings do not support research that proposes an “organization,” 
defined as efforts to find a collective voice, as a predictor of salience (Ali, 2017). Informal 
miners acted without apparent coordination nor a collective voice in groups defined by 
relations of kinship and transactions. They did not have national leaders or formal alliances, 
which made them more difficult to deal with.  
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Finally, our study confirms that MNEs have an important role to play in the design of 
new solutions for the governance of natural resources, poverty alleviation, and sustainable 
development in host countries; they can legitimize fringe stakeholders and their claims 
through cooperation and engagement. Although cooperation with poor rivals seeking a 
livelihood is a form of co-management, we need to acknowledge that MNEs have more 
power in the relationship and thus, greater control of the solution’s maintenance and 
outcomes. Cooperative strategies can become a stable response to conflict if they align with 
an appropriate stakeholder salience assessment and build mutual trust between stakeholders. 
Therefore, commitment of the MNEs to contribute to sustainable development in host nations 
is imperative for the successful delivery of cooperative strategies.  
 
6.1. Limitations and future research 
Our research uses a single case study design, applied to one country with a focus on 
gold mining as a sub-sector of the extractive industries. Future research may compare MNE 
relations with informal miners in other countries and explore empirical evidence for MNE 
collaborative arrangements in other resource rivalry situations. Future research on informal 
resource use can expand the scope of analysis to global value chains and include other global 
stakeholders in the analysis. Conceptually, corporate approaches to informal resource users in 
emerging markets can be further explored using institutional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 2010), 
poverty alleviation, and ethical trading as part of CSR programs (Kolk, 2016), and bottom of 
the pyramid approaches (Prahalad, 2006). 
The proposed SIAD analysis of stakeholder salience across governance levels can be 
combined with knowledge transfer and transaction-costs perspectives to analyze the 
scalability of solutions to sustainability challenges. Despite its implications for sustainable 
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development and socially inclusive practices, there has been very little discussion on fringe 
stakeholders in international business literature (Hart & Sharma, 2004). Future research could 
build on the SIAD framework to investigate solutions across governance levels for other 
types of rivalries and collaborative relationships between MNEs and fringe stakeholders. 
 
6.2. Managerial relevance 
Our research shows that seemingly fringe stakeholders can turn into rivals to be 
reckoned with by MNEs. We suggest that MNEs do not often engage with these stakeholders 
because their salience assessment has been misguided. The salience of informal rivals for 
resources has been negatively amplified by local governments. Misguided stakeholder 
assessments can lead to flaws in the design of corporate responses to business challenges and 
result in conflict, operational risks, and reputational damage. MNEs should build stakeholder 
assessments in close interaction with other legitimate stakeholders such as local communities. 
Concurring with the advice from international and industry organizations (ICMM, 2009; WB, 
2009), we suggest that MNE cooperation with informal rivals coming from indigenous, poor 
communities in emerging markets can become a win-win solution contributing to the 
attainment of organizational goals of secure access to resources and improved societal 
legitimacy of MNEs in host countries (Gifford et al., 2010) and societal goals of sustainable 
development, environmental protection, and poverty alleviation in emerging markets.  
For mining MNEs, supporting poverty-led ASM workers in sustaining their 
livelihoods is an imperative part of their CSR strategies. MNEs can take an active role in 
assisting ASM workers in social upgrading and up-skilling, providing technical expertise and 
improving ASM health and safety and environmental practices. Further initiatives can be 
explored in assisting informal miners to market their production. In the situation of 
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interaction with informal rival actors whose legitimacy is contested on legal grounds but 
supported by informal and customary rules, companies need to rely on local stakeholder 
networks to assess the legitimacy of stakeholder claims. They also need to consider the 
overall stability of a governance solution for sustainable development.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Poverty and social inclusion are very relevant sustainable development issues to 
consider in the context of international business. Despite acknowledging the causal relation 
between informality, poverty, and social exclusion, the literature on CSR in developing 
countries has not investigated factors that drive cooperation between MNEs and informal 
rivals for natural resource use. We address this gap by introducing the SIAD framework, 
which proposes a dynamic salience assessment of informal rivals and a cooperative role for 
MNEs in governing natural resources. We contend that for ethical and instrumental reasons, 
it is important for mining MNEs to take a more active role in governing natural resources, 
assisting poor communities with historical and traditional links to resource use and 
contributing to legitimization of informal resource users through cooperation. Forced 
replacement of customary rules with formal rules imposed by the state and international 
organizations can struggle to deliver a stable governance of natural resources. In this context, 
MNEs adopting a political strategy to rely on state policies to deal with informal resource 
rivals will not only fail to secure tenure but can indirectly affect social and environmental 
sustainability in host countries.  
The application of the SIAD framework allows MNEs to refine their strategies in a 
wider context of sustainable natural resource governance and its functional levels. We 
suggest that cooperation with unauthorized resource users offers an alternative third strategy 
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to the exit or wait strategies (Khanna & Palepu, 2010) when a political strategy fails to 
achieve organizational goals. This third way to secure tenure—through cooperation with 
informal resource users—can improve the security of the tenure and deliver sustainability 
benefits in terms of environmental protection, poverty alleviation, social inclusion, and 
employment support in local communities in emerging markets. Local environmental 
protection increases when MNEs coach artisanal miners on safe mining practices. MNEs play 
an important role in increasing the salience of fringe stakeholders within the business-
community-government nexus by “legitimization through engagement,” and thus, improve 
the social inclusion of poor stakeholders. “Legitimization through engagement” enables 
social upgrading because it influences the attitudes of other stakeholders towards previously 
illegitimate social groups. This study demonstrates that stakeholder salience is a dynamic 
process of assessment across different governance levels, where stakeholders can gain 
salience bottom-up from operational to constitutional levels and can lose salience top-down.  
CSR and international business scholars can apply the SIAD framework to analyze 
competition between MNEs and informal rivals in other natural resource sectors such as 
forestry, fishing, or other extractive sectors. In addition, SIAD can be applicable to the 
analysis of other situations where MNEs compete with informal poor rivals, such as 
counterfeit goods producers and retailers, for access to markets. Wider application and 
expansion of the SIAD framework will result in better understanding of how MNEs can 
contribute to the fulfillment of SDGs, particularly to reduce poverty, inequality, and 
unsustainable use of natural resources.  
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Figure 1. Stakeholder salience and governance levels 
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Table 1. Interviews with the range of actors in the ASM sector in Ghana, 2005-2008 
 
Range of actors 
 
2005 2008 
Government departments 
- Senior and middle tier officials at the national level 
- Official at the local level 
 
5 
4 
1 
6 
6 
0 
Small-scale miners and buyers 
- Registered small-scale miner 
- Gold buyers 
- Unregistered small-scale miner 
 
4 
2 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
Non-governmental organizations (NGO)/academia 
- University 
- National NGO 
- Local NGO 
 
3 
0 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
0 
Large-scale MNEs and industry associations 
- Large-scale MNEs 
- National mining association 
 
4 
3 
1 
2 
2 
0 
Total 16 10 
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Table 2. Political strategy vs. cooperative strategy to manage mineral resource conflict  
 
Functions of resource use solutions (Paavola, 2016) Political strategy  
(state-based solution) 
Cooperative strategy  
(stakeholder management solution) 
Exclusion of unauthorized users Government excludes un-registered, informal resource 
users from accessing the resource.  
 
MNEs collaborate with informal resource users in the 
concession to share access to resources and exclude 
new entrants. 
 
Regulation of authorized use and distribution of 
benefits 
Government regulates authorized users only and the 
benefits are distributed between the state and the 
authorized users.  
MNEs negotiate regulation directly with informal 
resource users in the concession and decide how to 
share the benefits of accessing the resources with 
them.  
 
Provisioning of rival and non-rival goods and recovery 
of costs  
Government provides technical assistance to registered 
resource users only. Both registered and unregistered 
resource users can sell the resource through state-run 
network of agents.  
MNEs can provide technical assistance to informal 
resource users. Both registered and unregistered 
resource users can sell the resource through a state-run 
network of agents. 
   
Monitoring of resource users and their compliance 
with rules 
Government monitors authorized users.  MNEs monitor informal resource users in their area of 
operations. 
 
Enforcement of rules of resource use Government removes unauthorized users by force and 
dialogue.  
Informal resource users collaborating with MNEs 
prevent other unauthorized users from accessing the 
resource. 
 
Resolution of conflicts over resource use Government resolves the conflict with force and 
dialogue.  
 
MNEs resolve conflict with informal resource users 
through direct negotiation and involvement of 
customary authorities. 
 
Decision-making and collective-choice for 
modification of governance solutions 
Government allows only authorized resource users to 
participate in design of solutions. 
 
MNEs allow selected informal resource users and 
customary authorities to participate in negotiations on 
resource use solutions. 
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Table 3. Government attitudes towards small-scale miners in Ghana, 2005-2008 
 
 
 
 
2005 
 
2008 
 
Illegal miners 
 
“Galamsey in this country, means people who are 
actually working on small-scale mining basis illegally. 
You can look at him as an armed robber.” 
(Government Official 1). 
 
 
Unregistered miners 
 
“For me I think that's not really illegal […] I see them 
as unregistered small-scale miners and I said by virtue 
of the fact that everybody is competing for that piece 
of land and you (MNEs) have been given the 
handshake first that does not mean that they were a 
criminal (Government Official 1). 
 
 
Illegal  
 
“Galamsey activities are illegal. It’s like saying; do 
you recognize an armed robber? Yes, I don’t think we 
should condone illegality” (Government Official 2). 
 
 
Informal  
 
“Galamsey are informal miners because they are 
contributing to the informal economy, they buy food 
and equipment from local communities. You need to 
understand in their culture, the land belongs to the 
community, even the chiefs do not own land” 
(Government Official 2). 
 
